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WHY DOES DOING THE RIGHT THING HAVE TO
BE SO HARD? A LAW FIRM PARTNER'S
DIFFICULT DECISION ON WHETHER TO REPORT
SUSPECTED MISCONDUCT
I. INTRODUCTION

A partner at a law firm never expects to be faced with the difficult
decision of whether to report potential misconduct on the part of another
lawyer. Unfortunately, these situations do occur. Imagine a situation in
which a partner comes across another lawyer's list of billable hours for a
particular client. And, imagine that those hours are abnormally high in light
of the fact that the lawyer was working on a routine project for the client.
What should a partner in this situation do next? Perhaps the partner will
pretend that he or she never became privy to such suspicions; or, perhaps the
partner, feeling a higher sense of ethical and moral duty, will report the
suspected misconduct to another partner. What happens if the reporting
partner's suspicions are ultimately found to be wrong? The once idealistic
partner may find himself or herself on the receiving end of an expulsion by
the other partners in the firm.
To understand all the issues involved in situations like the one above, one
must turn to the applicable case law. One of the first high courts to decide
such a case was the Texas Supreme Court in Bohatch v. Butler & Binion.1
The Bohatch court held that partners do not have a fiduciary duty to remain
partners with a partner whom they expelled, when the expelled partner acted
in good faith, but incorrectly, when charging another partner with over-billing
a client.
The majority made this decision even though the Rules of
Professional Conduct3 hold attorneys responsible for failing to take action
after receiving knowledge of another attorney's misconduct.4 Thus, under this
rationale, an attorney in Bohatch's situation is faced with a difficult decision.
The attorney could report the potential misconduct with the possibility of
being expelled from the partnership if found to be incorrect. 5 Alternatively, if
1. 977 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1998).
2. Id.
3. D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1(c) (1999). Although this is a Texas decision, both
lawyers were licensed in the District of Columbia, and the court applied the District of Columbia's
Rules. Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 545.
4. See Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 545.
5. Id. at 546-47.
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the attorney chooses not to report the potential misconduct, and the
misconduct is legitimate and brought to light, the bar ethics committee could
discipline the attorney 6for having knowledge of another attorney's misconduct
and failing to report it.
This Comment will argue that the court in Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, in
allowing partnerships to expel partners in Bohatch's situation, failed to
consider the negative implications on ethical duties in the legal profession.
More precisely, the court should have implemented a public policy exception
to partnership-at-will, similar to those found in whistleblower protection
statutes.7 Such an exception would promote ethical duties of lawyers without
seriously hindering the at-will nature of partnerships.
Part II of this Comment discusses the facts of Bohatch, and the rationale
behind the majority's decision not to recognize an exception to the at-will
nature of partnerships based on fiduciary duties. Part III discusses the
fiduciary duties that partners owe to each other-including how various courts
have defined the ambiguous term "good faith." Part IV will extrapolate the
ethical considerations that revolve around the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Part V will discuss the use of whistleblower protection statutes applied to
other kinds of employment. Finally, Part VI will present an argument in favor
of whistleblower protection as a solution to the struggle between fiduciary
duties, ethical duties, and the at-will nature of partnerships.

II. BOHATCH V. BUTLER & BINION
A. Facts
In Bohatch v. Butler & Binion,8 the plaintiff, Colette Bohatch, became a
partner at the Washington D.C. law firm of Butler & Binion in February
1990. 9 During her time as a partner, Bohatch received internal firm reports
containing information on the number of hours that each attorney worked and
billed to his or her clients.10 Upon reviewing the reports, Bohatch became
worried that another partner, John McDonald, was overbilling their client,
Pennzoil.' On July 15, 1990, Bohatch decided to voice her concerns to the

6. See infra notes 118-36 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 137-53 and accompanying text.
8. 977 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1998).
9. Id. at 544.
10. Id. Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Bohatch could be held responsible for
having knowledge of another attorney's misconduct and failing to report it. See infra notes 118-36
and accompanying text.
11. Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 544.
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firm's managing partner, Louis Paine, who decided to investigate the matter.' 2
Paine and another managing attorney, R. Hayden Burns, reviewed
Penzoil's bills along with their supporting computer printouts.' 3 They then
contacted Pennzoil's in-house counsel, John Chapman,' 4 who told the partners
that the bills were reasonable and that Pennzoil was satisfied. 5 After the
partners determined that Bohatch had no basis for her contentions, Paine met
with Bohatch and told her to begin seeking other employment.' 6 On October
7
21, 1991, Bohatch was formally expelled from the partnership by vote. 1
Three days prior to her expulsion, Bohatch filed a suit against the firm for
wrongful discharge, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of duty of good faith
and fair dealing.' 8 After winning on partial summary judgment and a jury
verdict, Bohatch was awarded $57,000 for lost wages, $250,000 for past
mental anguish, and $237,000 for punitive damages.' 9 On appeal, the court of
appeals held that the only duty the firm owed to Bohatch was "not to expel
her in bad faith., 20 The court concluded that the other partners did not expel
Bohatch for self-gain, and thus she could not recover for breach of fiduciary
duty. 2' The court found that she was entitled to $35,000 in lost earnings, but
disallowed damages for mental anguish.22 The case was eventually appealed
to the Supreme Court of Texas.
B. Opinion
The Supreme Court of Texas recognized that "'[t]he relationship
between... partners... is fiduciary in character, and imposes upon all the
participants the obligation of loyalty to the joint concern and of the utmost
good faith, fairness, and honesty in their23dealings with each other with respect
to matters pertaining to the enterprise.",
The court went on to cite various cases standing for the propositions that a

12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.

15. Id.
16. Id. After the meeting with Paine, Bohatch stopped receiving projects, and, in January 1991,
the firm reduced her partnership distribution share to zero. Id.at 544-45.
17. Id. at 545.

18. Id.
19. Id. Bohatch initially was awarded $4,000,000 for punitive damages, but the award was
reduced under remittitur. Id.

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. She was allowed lost earnings because the partnership agreement was breached. Id.
23. Id.(quoting Fitz-Gerald v. Hull, 237 S.W.2d 256, 264 (Tex. 1951)).
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partner can be expelled for purely business purposes,24 for the protection of
relationships within the firm and with clients,2 5 or for the mitigation of a
"fundamental schism." 26 Moreover, the court stated that the fiduciary duties
that partners owe one another do not give an expelled partner the right to sue
for tort damages.27 Thus,
[]ust as a partner can be expelled, without a breach of any common
law duty, over disagreements about firm policy or to resolve some
other 'fundamental schism,' a partner can be expelled for accusing
another partner of overbilling without subjecting the partnership to tort
damages. Such charges, whether true or not, may have a profound
effect on the personal confidence and trust essential to the partner
relationship.2 8
Although the court did give some credence to Bohatch's and amici's
argument that not protecting a partner who, in good faith, reports suspected
overbilling would fail to encourage lawyers to comply with the Rules of
Professional Conduct,29 the court ultimately concluded that protecting
whistleblowers would no more encourage attorneys to report suspected
overbilling than the ethical duties in and of themselves.3 °
Finally, the court emphasized the at-will nature of partnerships. The court
stated that "partners have no obligation to remain partners; 'at the heart of the
partnership concept is the principle that partners may choose with whom they

24. Id. at 546 (citing St. Joseph's Reg'l Health Ctr. v. Munos, 934 S.W.2d 192, 197 (Ark.
1996); Waite v. Sylvester, 560 A.2d 619, 622-23 (N.H. 1989); Leigh v. Crescent Square, Ltd., 608
N.E.2d 1166, 1170 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)).
25. Id. (citing Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray, 562 N.E.2d 435, 442 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990);
Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 523 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974)).
26. Id. (citing Waite, 560 A.2d at 623; Heller v. Pillsbury Madison & Sutro, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d
336, 348 (Ct. App. 1996); Levy v. Nassau Queens Med. Group, 476 N.Y.S. 2d 613, 614 (App. Div.
1984)).
27. Id. at 546.
28. Id. at 546-47.
29. Id. at 546. The following nine distinguished professors submitted amicus curiae briefs
arguing that the expulsion of a partner for reporting unethical conduct constitutes bad faith and is a
breach of fiduciary duty: Professor Richard L. Abel of the University of California at Los Angeles
School of Law, Professor Leonard Gross of Southern Illinois University School of Law, Professor
Robert W. Hamilton of the University of Texas School of Law, Professor David J. Luban of the
University of Maryland School of Law, Professor Gary Minda of the Brooklyn Law School,
Professor Ronald D. Rotunda of the University of Illinois College of Law, Professor Theodore J.
Schneyer of the University of Arizona College of Law, Professor Clyde W. Summers of the
University of Pennsylvania School of Law, and Professor Charles W. Wolfram of the Cornell School
of Law. Id. at 554 (Hecht, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 547.
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wish to be associated."' ' 31 In the end, the court refused to recognize that the
fiduciary relationship among partners creates an exception to the at-will
nature of partnerships and held that the firm did not have a duty to retain
Bohatch for her reporting of suspected overbilling.32
III. FIDUCIARY DUTIES AMONG PARTNERS
A. The Revised Uniform PartnershipAct
The Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1997 (RUPA) 33 was created after
the states became dissatisfied with the Uniform Partnership Act of 1914.34
RUPA provides two fiduciary duties that partners owe to each other: the duty
of loyalty and the duty of care.35 The duty of loyalty is limited to the
following three standards:
(1) to account to the partnership and hold as trustee for it any property,
profit, or benefit derived by the partner in the conduct and winding up
of the partnership business or derived from a use by the partner of
partnership property, including the appropriation of a partnership
opportunity;
(2) to refrain from dealing with the partnership in the conduct or
winding up of the partnership business as or on behalf of a party
having an interest adverse to the partnership; and
(3) to refrain from competing with the partnership in the conduct of
the partnership business before the dissolution of the partnership. 6
As for the duty of care, a partner's duty to the partnership is "limited to
refraining from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional

31. Id.at 545 (quoting Gelder Med. Group v. Webber, 363 N.E.2d 573, 577 (N.Y. 1977)).
32. Id.at 547.
33. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 1-274 (2001 & Supp. 2003).
34. ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING
PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 18 (7th ed. Supp. 2001).
The Uniform

Partnership Act of 1914 had been adopted by forty-nine states. Id. at 1. As of 2000, the 1997
version of RUPA had been adopted by twenty-four jurisdictions: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana,
Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands,
Washington, and the District of Columbia. Id.at 19.
35. See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
36. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(b) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 143 (2001 & Supp. 2003).
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37
misconduct, or a knowing violation of law.
In addition to those statutory duties, common law has created two
fundamental standards that partners must follow. First, partners have
"obligations of the utmost good faith and integrity in their dealings with one
another in partnership affairs. 3 8 Second, "the partners' relationship is one of
trust and confidence when dealing with each other in partnership matters. 3 9
Although RUPA does not specifically define the duty of good faith, an
implied covenant of good faith exists in every contract.4 ° Whenever a
partnership exercises a contractual right or uses its power to involuntarily
expel a member from the partnership, "[i]t must not appear that the
partnership acts out of a desire to gain a business or property advantage for
the remaining partners in bad faith. ' 4l Because RUPA has failed to define
good faith, courts often turn to common law definitions of good faith or adopt
their own definitions.4 2

B. Common Law

In light of the fact that RUPA does not define the duty of good faith owed
by partners, the following cases display how courts from various jurisdictions
have interpreted the ambiguous concept of "good faith" and applied it to
various instances involving the expulsion of a partner from a law firm.
Although some of these cases were decided before the existence of RUPA,
they all remain the law in their respective jurisdictions. The following two
subsections are divided into cases in which the courts ultimately held that the
parties did not violate the duty of good faith and those cases in which the
court held that the parties did violate the duty of good faith.
37. Id.
38. 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partnership § 280 (2003) (citing Leff v. Gunter, 658 P.2d 740 (Cal.
1983); Wash. Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Holle, 573 A.2d 1269 (D.C. 1990); Couri v. Couri, 447 N.E.2d 334
(Ill. 1983); Barksdale v. Lincoln Builders, Inc., 764 So. 2d 223 (La. Ct. App. 2000); Starr v.
Fordham, 648 N.E.2d 1261 (Mass. 1995); Covalt v. High, 675 P.2d 999 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983); Pace
v. Perk, 440 N.Y.S.2d 710 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); Reddington v. Thomas, 262 S.E.2d 841 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1980); Pear v. Grand Forks Motel Assocs., 553 N.W.2d 774 (N.D. 1996); Bohatch v. Butler &
Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1998)).
39. Id. (citing Tucker v. Ellbogen, 793 P.2d 592 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989); Seitovitz v. Levin, 224
N.W. 613 (Mich. 1929); Heller v. Hartz Mountain Indus., 636 A.2d 599 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div.
1993); Fouchek v. Janicek, 225 P.2d 783 (Or. 1950)).
40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).

41. 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partnership § 327 (2003) (citing Gelder Med. Group v. Webber, 363
N.E.2d 573 (N.Y. 1977)).
42. See Margaret K. Kirkpatrick, Comment, Partners Dumping Partners: Business Before
Ethics in Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 83 MINN. L. REv. 1767, 1781 (1999). For an argument that
"good faith" should be defined in RUPA, see Robert M. Phillips, Comment, Good Faith and Fair
Dealing Under the Revised Uniform PartnershipAct, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 1179, 1183-84 (1993).
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1. Cases in Which the Duty of Good Faith was not Violated
In Holman v. Coie,43 plaintiffs Francis Holman and William Holman were
both partners in a law firm. 4 The partnership agreement of the law firm
stated that any member could be expelled by a majority vote of the executive
committee. 45 The partnership agreement, however, failed to specify whether
members of the firm could be expelled without cause.46
Subsequent to the Holmans becoming partners, their relationship with the
firm began to wane.47 William Holman questioned whether a client, Boeing,
was being adequately charged for legal services rendered by the firm.48 In
addition, in 1968 Francis Holman was elected to the Washington State
Senate. 49 During his tenure he was not only praised in a newspaper article for
his independence from Boeing in regards to a tax policy that he favored, but
he also gave a speech in April 1969 on personal property tax that irritated top
officials at Boeing. ° In May 1969, both William Holman and Francis
Holman were expelled from the firm by a seven to two vote of the executive
5
committee. 1
The plaintiffs contended that an implied duty of good faith exists between
partners and that the executive committee breached this duty by expelling the
plaintiffs. 52 The Washington Court of Appeals did recognize that, as a general
rule, partners must exercise good faith in their dealings with each other. 3 The
court went on to state that "'[t]he relation existing between copartners is one
requiring the exercise of the utmost good faith. Each partner is a trustee for
all, and no individual or group may take an unconscionable advantage of
54
another."'
The court defined good faith as "'[a]n honest intention to abstain from
taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even through technicalities
of law, together with an absence of all information, notice or benefit or belief

43. 522 P.2d 515 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
44. Id. at 517.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 518.
51. Id. at 519.
52. Id. at 523.
53. Id.
54. Id.(quoting Danich v. Culjak, 66 P.2d 860, 863 (Wash. 1937)); see also Karle v. Seder, 214
P.2d 684, 687 (Wash. 1950) (discussing the same).

1012

MARQUETTE LA W REVIEW

[87:1005

of facts which would render transaction unconscientious."' 55 The court,
however, limited the duty of good faith to dealings among partners relating to
partnership property or business aspects of the partnership, and thus, the duty
did not apply to the situation in this case. 56 The court stated that there was no
evidence that the partners were5 7expelled so as to give a business or property
advantage to the other partners.
Another case in which a court found that a law firm did not violate the
duty of good faith is Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray.58 In Lawlis, the plaintiff
Gerald Lawlis, a general partner in the defendant law firm, was unable to
practice law for several months due to his alcoholism. 59 When the Finance
Committee became aware of Lawlis's problem, it immediately contacted an
60
area physician, who was an expert in alcohol abuse, to treat Lawlis.
Although Lawlis received treatment from 1983 to 1984,61 by March 1984 he
resumed his consumption of alcohol and had to receive treatment a second
time. 62
The Finance Committee then decided Lawlis would have to meet
specified conditions to continue with the partnership, including meetings with
a specialist and treatment and consultation regarding his alcohol problem.6 3
Lawlis eventually resolved his alcohol addiction and was congratulated by
several members of the firm.64 When Lawlis asked the Finance Committee to
increase his participation back to normal, however, he was told that the
committee was going to sever his relationship with the law firm. 65 The
Finance Committee did, in fact, expel Lawlis from the firm by a seven to one
vote pursuant to the partnership agreement after he failed to accept a
severance package.66
On appeal Lawlis argued that his expulsion breached the implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing.67 The Indiana Court of Appeals recognized the
implied duty and stated that "if the power to involuntarily expel partners
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
Lawlis's
65.
66.
67.

Holman, 522 P.2d at 524 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 822 (4th ed. 1951)).
Id.at 523.
Id.
562 N.E.2d 435 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
Id.at 437.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 438.
Id.
Id. A senior partner who was also a member of the finance committee even commented on
full recovery. Id.
Id.
Id.The only vote in favor of keeping Lawlis was his own. Id.
Id.at 440.
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granted by a partnership agreement is exercised in bad faith or for a
'predatory purpose,' ... the partnership agreement is violated, giving rise to
an action for damages the affected partner has suffered as a result of his
expulsion., 68 The court defined good faith as "'a state of mind indicating
honesty and lawfulness of purpose: belief in one's legal title or right: belief
that one's conduct is not unconscionable ... : absence of fraud, deceit,
collusion, or gross negligence."' 6 9 Similar to the Holman v. Coie court,7 ° the
court in this case also recognized that the duty of good faith among partners
applies only to partnership property and business relations.7' In fact, the court
determined
that the duty of good faith did not apply under the facts in this
72
case.

A third case in which a court found that partners did not violate their duty
of good faith was Heller v. Pillsbury Madison & Sutro.73 In that case, Philip
Heller, a partner at the law firm Pillsbury Madison & Sutro, was expelled by
his fellow partners for his failure to meet billing requirements 74 and for
conduct that proved detrimental to the relationship between the law firm and
some of its more profitable clients.7 5
The court recognized that although partners owe a fiduciary duty to each
other, the duty applies only to instances in which a partner can use his or her
position for personal benefit or against the interests of the partnership.76 In
applying this fiduciary duty to the expulsion of a partner, the court stated that
partners cannot expel another partner in bad faith.77 According
to the court,
78
bad faith in this context means expelling a partner for self-gain.
The court found no evidence that the partners expelled Heller for their
own personal benefit. 79 Although Heller's expulsion increased the profit
shares of the remaining partners, the court found that this amount was

68. Id. (internal quotes omitted).
69. Id.at 443 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1976)).
70. 522 P.2d 515 (Wash. App. 1974); seesupranotes 43-57.
71. Lawlis, 562 N.E.2d at 442.
72. See id. (stating that the plaintiff was not expelled for the financial gain of the remaining
partners).
73. 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336 (Ct. App. 1996).
74. Id.at 340-42. Heller billed only 1200 hours, 1000 hours less than what he was expected to
produce. Id.at 340.
75. Id. at 340-42. Significantly, Heller's conduct caused friction between the firm and two of
its valued clients whose business to the firm was worth over six million dollars annually. Id.
76. Id.at 348 (citing Leigh v. Crescent Square, Ltd., 608 N.E.2d 1166, 1170 (Ohio Ct. App.
1992)).
77. Id.(citing Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 905 S.W.2d 597, 602 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995)).
78. Id.(citing Bohatch, 905 S.W.2d at 602).
79. Id.
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insubstantial in light of the fact that there were
over two hundred partners, one
80
hundred of whom earned more than Heller.
2. Cases in Which the Duty of Good Faith was Violated
The first case in which a court found that law firm partners violated their
duty of good faith was Beasley v. Cadwalader,Wickersham & Taft.8 1 Beasley
involved a partner, James Beasley, who laterally transferred from the New
York branch of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft (CW&T) to the Palm Beach
office. 82 Soon after Beasley made the transfer, the Palm Beach office began
to suffer financially.83 CW&T's management committee decided to terminate
partners from84each of its offices throughout the country, including the Palm
Beach office.
After Beasley received notice of the management committee's decision to
terminate him, Beasley responded by claiming that CW&T's partnership
agreement did not bestow upon the management committee the power to
expel him. 85 The management committee then offered Beasley a transfer to
either the New York or the Washington D.C. branch of the firm or a severance
package.86 Beasley rejected both offers as impractical.87
At trial Beasley argued that CW&T breached the fiduciary duties it owed
to him. 88 Beasley based his breach of fiduciary duty claim on three theories:
(1) the firm's expulsion of Beasley violated the partnership agreement; (2) the
firm failed to give adequate notice of their intention to close the Palm Beach
office; and (3) the management committee's decision to expel Beasley and
other partners was done for the financial benefit of the remaining partners. 89
The court determined that CW&T's conduct "cannot be said to be honorable,
much less to comport with the 'punctilio of an honor."' 90 Thus, the court
agreed with Beasley's contention that CW&T breached its fiduciary duty
based on the facts and alluded to CW&T's financial motivations for deciding

80. Id.
81. 728 So. 2d 253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
82. Id. at 255.
83. Id.
84. Id In fact, all of the partners of the Palm Beach office were identified for termination. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. Although Beasley was a member of the New York bar as well as the Florida bar, id, he
had been practicing law in South Florida for twenty-two years. Id. at 255-56.
88. Id.at 255.
89. Allan W. Vestal, Law PartnerExpulsions, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1083, 1104 (1998)
(citing Beasley, 728 So. 2d at 255).
90. Beasley, 728 So. 2d at 259.
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to expel Beasley. 1
Another case in which a court held that partners violated the duty of good
faith was Ehrlich v. Howe.92 In June 1989, Richard Ehrlich joined the law
firm Sann & Howe. 93 As a requirement of his employment, Ehrlich signed a
partnership agreement, which in part allowed the expulsion of a partner by
unanimous vote by the other partners. 94 In September 1991, Ehrlich was
terminated from the law firm by a unanimous vote of all the partners pursuant
to the partnership agreement. 95 Ehrlich was neither given notice,
nor was he
96
present at the partnership meeting in which he was expelled.
The court recognized that there is an implied duty of good faith in all
partnership agreements. 97 The court went on to state that this duty is one of
"'finest loyalty' and 'honor most sensitive."' 98 Moreover, the court stated that
the fiduciary duties owed by the partners are based on the partnership
agreement. 99 Since the court found that the unambiguous language of the
agreement required that the issue of expulsion be "before the partnership," the
failure to notify the plaintiff of the meeting was a breach of the partners'
fiduciary duties.' 00
A third case on the concept of good faith in the context of partnership
expulsions is Winston & Strawn v. Nosal.'0 Nosal was a case of first
impression for the Illinois Appellate02 Court on the issue of good faith as it
relates to the expulsion of a partner. 1
Chester Nosal was a partner for the general practice firm of Winston &
Strawn, headquartered in Chicago.' 0 3 In 1982, Nosal moved to the
91. See id.at 256 (stating that the evidence shows that Beasley was anticipatorily expelled by
the firm when it decided to close its Palm beach office). For a more in depth look at Beasley, see
Karen Dillon, The CadwaladerParadox,THE AMERICAN LAWYER, Sept. 1996.
92. 848 F. Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
93. Id.at 484.
94. Id.at 485; see also Donald J.Nettles, Comment, Do We Really Need Expulsion Procedures
in PartnershipAgreements: The Inadequaciesof PartnershipLaw as it Relates to Law Partnerships,
J. LEGAL PROF. 209 (2001) (arguing that partnership agreements should not circumvent the duty of
good faith); Wayne N. Outten & Sean Farhang, Firm Governance: When and How Can a Firm Expel
a Partner,LAW FIRM PARTNERSHIP & BENEFITS, Sept. 2000 (discussing the same).
95. Ehrlich, 848 F. Supp. at 485.
96. Id.;
see also Vestal, supranote 89, at 1098 (discussing the Ehrlich case).
97. Ehrlich, 848 F. Supp. at 491.
98. Id.(quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 492.
101. 664 N.E.2d 239 (111.App. Ct. 1996).
102. Maggie M. Finkelstein, Note, "'Learning to do Right "' When Right Is Wrong, 9 WIDENER
J. PUB. L. 99, 109 (1999).
103. Nosal, 664 N.E.2d at 240-41.
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Washington D.C. branch of the firm where he practiced international law and
assisted with office management. 0 4 In 1992, members of the Washington
D.C. branch, including Nosal, were discharged from the firm due to economic
reasons. 10 5 When Nosal refused to vacate the firm, he was expelled by a vote
of 55 to 16.106 Significantly, from 1988 until Nosal's discharge, Nosal
repeatedly asked to view the firm's financial status, executive committee
meeting minutes, and records of partnership compensation. 10 7 Nosal also sent
the firm's managing partner a written memorandum in regards to the firm's
denying his access to the books and records. 0 8 Nosal contended that the firm
violated the duty of good faith, which it owed to him as a partner. 10 9 He
argued that the sole reason for his
dismissal was his insistance on viewing the
0
partnership books and records."
The Nosal court recognized that "a fiduciary relationship exists between
partners and that each partner is bound to exercise the utmost good faith and
honesty in all matters relating to the partnership business.""' Furthermore,
the court stated that there were sufficient facts to raise an inference that Nosal
was expelled because of his persistence in trying to view partnership books
and records.'12 Although the partnership agreement required no showing of
cause to expel a partner," 13 the court found that "this does not abrogate [the
partner's] high duty to exercise good faith and fair dealing in the execution of
such discretion." ' 1 4 Moreover, the court overturned the trial court's summary
15
judgment ruling against Nosal's argument for dissolution of the partnership,"
even though the partnership agreement said that no such dissolution would
occur by the expulsion of a partner."16
As shown above, courts from various jurisdictions have interpreted the
concept of good faith in different ways. In some cases the courts held that the

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 243.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 244-45 (citing Couri v. Couri, 447 N.E.2d 334 (1983); Bakalisu v. Blessler, 115
N.E.2d 323 (1953); Labovitz v. Dolan, 545 N.E.2d 304 (1989)).
112. Id. at 246. One should note that the partnership agreement specifically gave partners the
right to view partnership books and records. Id. at 245.
113. Id. at 242.
114. Id. at 246 (citing Labovitz, 545 N.E.2d 304).
115. Id. at 244.
116. Id. The court wrote that a dissolution may be ordered if a single partner is wrongfully
excluded from a partnership business. Id. at 246.
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partners did not violate the duty of good faith, and in other cases courts held
the opposite. The issues of partnership expulsion and good faith become even
with the ethical considerations of the
more complex when they intertwine
7
Conduct.'"
Rules of Professional
IV. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Another important issue that the court addressed in Bohatch v. Butler &
Binion 118 was the effect of the Rules of Professional Conduct.'1 9 The legal
profession is essentially regulated by the people that make up the
profession. 120 A lawyer's duty to report another lawyer's misconduct is
important to the legal profession in accomplishing the task of selfregulation. 12 The rationale behind charging attorneys with a duty to report
other lawyers' misconduct is based on three concerns:
The first is shielding clients from potential abuses, such as
misrepresentation, misappropriation of funds, or betrayal of
confidences .... A second concern involves safeguarding the
administration of justice from those who might subvert it through
subordination of perjury, misrepresentation, bribery, or the like.

[A] ... less

frequently

articulated,

rationale

for

character

screening rests on the bar's own interest in maintaining a professional
community and public image ....

• . .An overriding objective of any organized profession is to
enhance its22 members' social standing, and the bar is scarcely an
exception.
In addition, "[i]f lawyers cannot be held accountable for reporting their

117. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (1998).
118. 977 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1998).
119. D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (1999).
120. Douglas R. Richmond, The Duty to Report ProfessionalMisconduct: A PracticalAnalysis
of Lawyer Self-Regulation, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 175, 175 (1999).
121. Kathryn W. Tate, The Boundaries of ProfessionalSelf Policing: Must a Law Firm Prevent
and Report a Finn Member's Securities Trading on the Basis of Client Confidences?, 40 U. KAN. L.
REV. 807, 811 (1992).
122. Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Characteras a ProfessionalCredential,94 YALE L.J. 491, 50810(1985).
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peers' misconduct, then they 'are
protecting little, and their professional skills
123
value."
little
have
services
and
In Bohatch, although the case was tried in Texas, both Bohatch and the
partner who was investigated for overbilling were licensed to practice in the
District of Columbia. 124 Thus, the court applied the District of Columbia
25
Code of Professional Responsibility. 1
Today, the District of Columbia follows the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.126 Rule 5.1(c) applies to situations where lawyers are held
responsible for another lawyer's misconduct:
A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct if: (1) The lawyer orders or, with
knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or
(2) The lawyer has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer
or is a partner in the law firm in which the other lawyer practices, and
knows or reasonably should know of the conduct at a time when its
consequences can27be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable
remedial action.'
The reasonable standard as mentioned in the rule involves an objective
analysis of the surrounding circumstances such as the size of the firm and how
it is organized, the type of interaction between the lawyers, the position of the
lawyer within the firm, the type of responsibilities that the lawyer is given, the
type of misconduct, and the circumstances surrounding the supervision that
28
was exercised, if any was exercised at all.1
Another significant provision articulated in the District of Columbia Rules
is Rule 8.3, which states that "[a] lawyer having knowledge that another
lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that
raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or
fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional
authority." ' 129 Moreover, a lawyer is guilty of committing such misconduct
123. Richmond, supra note 120, at 176.
124. Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Tex. 1998).
125. The District of Columbia Code of Professional Responsibility governed the conduct of
lawyers licensed in Washington D.C. through 1990. Id.
126. The Rules of Professional Conduct, which took effect in the District of Columbia in
January 1991, are more or less the same as the rules involved in the Bohatch case, which were taken
from the District of Columbia Code of ProfessionalResponsibility. Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 560 n.2
(Specter, J., dissenting); Finklestein, supra note 102, at 114 n.128.
127. D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1(c) (1999).
128. Id. R. 5.1 cmt. 4.
129. Id. R. 8.3(a). The term "substantial" in this provision refers to the seriousness of the
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under the Rules of Professional Conduct when he or she "[v]iolate[s] or
attempt[s] to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist[s] or
induce[s] another to do so, or do[es] so through acts of another;...
[e]ngage[s]
in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
30
misrepresentation."1
The first case in which a lawyer was held responsible for failing to report
the misconduct of another lawyer was In re Himmel. 131 In Himmel, attorney
James H. Himmel, learned through his client that another lawyer, John R.
Casey, converted the client's settlement check. 132 The court found that
Himmel was guilty of professional misconduct for failing to report Casey's
wrongdoing.133 The Hearing Board recommended that Himmel be privately
reprimanded; however, the Illinois Supreme Court imposed a one-year
suspension on Himmel.134 The court also stated that a lawyer can be
disciplined for failing to report another lawyer's misconduct even if
dishonesty was not involved 135 and that the attorney's failure
to report such
' 36
misconduct interfered "with the administration of justice."'
As the above discussion has shown, the Rules of Professional Conduct
create important ethical duties for lawyers when discovering misconduct. To
better encourage lawyers to follow such ethical duties, whistleblower
protection is the answer.
V. WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION
To encourage the reporting of misconduct by employees, Congress
devised the whistleblower statute. Federal whistleblower statutes fall into two
categories. The first category is comprised of statutes promulgated to
encourage whistleblowing through incentives. 137 The second and more

misconduct, not the quantity of evidence. Id.R. 8.3 cmt. 3.
130. Id. R. 8.4. This Rule includes "violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or serious
interference with the administration ofjustice." Id.R. 8.4 cmt. 1.
131. 533 N.E.2d 790 (I11.
1988). For a brief discussion ofIn re Himmel, see Finklestein, supra
note 102, at 115-16.
132. In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d at 791. The client received a settlement check for injury and
property damage that she suffered in a motorcycle accident. Id.
133. Id.at 794-95.
134. Id.
135. 1d.at 794.
136. Id.at 795-96.
137. Elletta S.Callahan & Terry M. Dworkin, The State of State Whistleblower Protection, 38
AM. Bus. L.J. 99, 100 (2000); see, e.g., Federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2000)
(providing rewards to whistle blowers who successfully prosecute fraud against the government);
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (1998) (mitigating sanctions against corporations

guilty of a federal crime who have implemented effective compliance programs).
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popular category of statutes protects employees against retaliation. 138 Since
the 1960s, Congress has enacted many federal statutes that limit the
employment at-will doctrine through the use of whistleblower provisions,
which protect employees who report illegal conduct from vengeful
employers. 139
State legislatures have also passed statutes to protect employees who seek
to report violations of laws or regulations. 140 The majority of the states follow

the notion that actual misconduct is not required for an employee to recover
under a whistleblower statute. 141

To address the problem of employees

making unsubstantiated accusations, several states remove protection from an
employee

whose
42
unreasonable. 1

claims

are

poorly

investigated

or

completely

138. See, e.g., infra note 139.
139. See 5 U.S.C. § 2303 (2000); 10 U.S.C. § 1034 (2000); 10 U.S.C. § 2409 (2000); 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1790b, 1831j (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (2000); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1514A (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 158(4),
215(a) (2000); 31 U.S.C. § 5328 (2000); 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (2003); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997d, 2000e-3,
5851, 6971, 7239, 7622, 9610, 20109 (2000); 49 U.S.C. § 31105, 4212 (2000).
140. See ALA. CODE § 25-8-57 (2000); ALASKA STAT. §§ 08.68.279, 24.60.035, 39.90.100
(Michie 2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-1-603 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2001); CAL. GOV'T CODE §
9149.23 (West 1991 & Supp. 2003); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1278.5 (West 2000); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 24-50.5-103(1) (1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-37j (West 1998 & Supp. 2002);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-615.53 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.3187 (West 2002); GA. CODE. ANN. §
34-9-24 (1998 & Supp. 2002); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-62 (Michie 1998 & SUPP. 2002); 5 ILL
COMP. STAT. ANN. 395/1 (West 1993 & Supp. 2002); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/34-2.4c (West
1998 & Supp. 2002); 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/52 (West 1997); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
175/3 (West 2002); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 130/1 lb (West 1999 & Supp. 2002); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 75-2973 (1997 & Supp. 2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:440.3 (West 1999); MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH OCC. §§ 1-502 to -503 (2000 & Supp. 2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.362
(West 1994 & Supp. 2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-E:2 (1999 & Supp. 2002); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 34:19-3 (West 2000 & Supp. 2002); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (Consol. 1983 & Supp. 2002);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4113.52 (Anderson 2001 & Supp. 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 8402.5 (West 2002 & Supp. 2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.203 (2001); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §
6020.1112 (West 1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1423 (West 1991 & Supp. 2002); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, § 4000.1714 (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.14-29 (2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-45
(2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-50-3 (2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 42.40.030, 42.40.035 (West
2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.2 10 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
70.124.100 (West 2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 74.34.180 (West 2002); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
6c- 1-3 (Michie 2000); see generally Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will
Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976) (discussing the plight of the employment-at-will doctrine
from its history to the present).
141. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-E:2 (1999 & Supp. 2002); see also Callahan &
Dworkin, supra note 137, at 120 (discussing the majority approach of state whistle blower protection
statutes). For a discussion of the New York approach, see id at 121.
142. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-50.5-103(1)(a) (1979) (standing for the proposition that
an employee who knowingly or recklessly discloses false information is exempt from whistle blower
protection); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.52 (Anderson 2001 & Supp. 2001) (requiring a "good
faith effort to determine the accuracy of any information ... reported").
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VI. WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION FOR LAWYERS REPORTING SUSPECTED
MISCONDUCT

The flaw in Bohatch lies in the assumption that lawyers will continue to
report other lawyers' potential wrongdoings even though a reporting lawyer
could very well lose his or her job in the process. The court bases
this
143
assumption on the duties found in the Rules of Professional Conduct.
However, the court failed to realize that there can be instances in which a
lawyer's misconduct is so subtle that only a fellow lawyer working in the
same office as the offending lawyer would have the ability to discover such
misconduct. These subtle instances could very well cause a lawyer to think
twice about reporting such misconduct in light of the possible repercussions if
he or she is later found to be wrong. For example, a lawyer could easily
conduct unnecessary research on behalf of a client and then bill the client for
the additional cost without the client ever knowing, or a lawyer could simply
bill for work not done. The danger of lawyer misconduct is especially
apparent when dealing with unsophisticated clients who have little knowledge
of billable hours and legal work. In these instances of subtle misconduct,
nothing short of a person with a legal background working in the same
workplace as the deviant lawyer could even hope to have the opportunity to
discover such misconduct. Because these subtle instances of misconduct are
not easily discoverable, a lawyer has little motivation to report such conduct.
Plainly stated, if a lawyer reports such conduct and is found to be wrong, he
or she could be expelled from a partnership. On the other hand, if the
suspiciously acting lawyer is indeed involved in such subtle misconduct and
the other lawyer does not report it, there is a good chance the misconduct will
go undiscovered.
The problem with Bohatch is that a lawyer apprised of the case may very
well think twice about reporting evidence of a fellow lawyer's potential
misconduct if the misconduct, if true, would not be readily discoverable.
Moreover, in making the decision to report such misconduct, a lawyer not
only finds himself or herself in the difficult situation of effectively accusing a
fellow lawyer, but also has the potential of being terminated through
expulsion if the charges are found to be incorrect. And one must remember
that, according to the court in Bohatch, a lawyer who reports potential
wrongdoing with the utmost good faith in mind, but is later found to be
144
wrong, is not safe from the retaliatory vote of his or her fellow partners.
Thus, a lawyer in such a position could easily be dissuaded from ever

143. See supra notes 118-36 and accompanying text.
144. See Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1998).
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reporting potential misconduct in the likelihood that the misconduct will never
come to light. 145 In the end, only the client suffers.
A simple and equitable way to resolve the problems that are involved with
lawyers reporting misconduct is to provide lawyers with the same
whistleblower protections given to other employees. To accomplish the dual
goals of encouraging lawyers to report the misconduct of other lawyers while
allaying any fears that lawyers may have about being expelled, the court
should apply the same standards of protections found in many whistleblower
protection provisions. A good example would be the standard of protection
adopted by New Hampshire. 146 New Hampshire provides protection for
employees who, in good faith, disclose conduct that they reasonably believe
violates any law or regulation. 147 Why not apply similar protections to
lawyers? A standard such as the one found in New Hampshire encourages
lawyers to report potential misconduct, yet it provides no protection for those
lawyers who seek to make unfounded accusations. In fact, applying such a
standard to Bohatch, the court arguably would not have afforded Bohatch any
protection. Bohatch provided no real evidence that the accused partner ever
engaged in any such conduct.1 48 The only thing the partner was guilty of was
keeping sloppy time records. 149 Thus, Bohatch would have likely not met the
"reasonably believed" requirement.
Justice Hecht, who wrote the concurring opinion in Bohatch, stated that a
partner at a law firm who reports suspected misconduct but is later found to be
incorrect can never be afforded recovery for being expelled. 150 Under a
whistleblower standard like New Hampshire's that contains a "good faith"
and a "reasonable belief' element, incorrect claims that are unsubstantiated
would receive no protection; however, one can imagine some instances when
a lawyer who, in good faith and with reasonable belief, reports suspected
misconduct, which is later found to be untrue. Although Justice Hecht would
not provide protection for lawyers in these instances, this rationale is illreasoned. A lawyer who, in good faith and with reasonable belief, reports
suspected misconduct, whether found true, has the same good intentions, and
thus, it makes little sense to provide protection for one but not the other.

145. See Thomas A. Kuczajda, Self-Regulation, Socialization, and the Role of Model Rule 5.1,
12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 119, 119 (1998) (arguing that "as incentives for reporting violations of
such rules decrease, incentives to step around the rules rise...").
146. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-E:2 (1999 & Supp. 2002).
147. § 275-E:2; see also In Appeal of Osram Sylvania, Inc., 706 A.2d 172 (N.H. 1998)
(applying New Hampshire's whistle blower statute).
148. Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 555.
149. Id. (Hecht, J., concurring).
150. Id. (Hecht, J., concurring).
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In addition, Justice Hecht articulated concerns of hindered partner
relationships due to a partnership's inability to expel partners who are
mistaken in reporting potential misconduct.' 5'
The problem with this
argument is that it essentially claims that it is more important to maintain the
law firm business than to promote ethics.152
A quarrelsome office
environment could negatively impact how efficiently partners work and, thus,
have a negative impact on the law firm as a business. 153 This emphasis on
business over ethics is precisely why the majority and Justice Hecht had to
interpret the fiduciary duty of good faith as not applying to Bohatch's
situation. Promoting the financial stability of a law firm as opposed to
promoting ethical duties likely falls outside of any concept of good faith.
VII. CONCLUSION

Overall, the court's refusal in Bohatch v. Butler & Binion to create an
exception to the at-will nature of partnerships will likely have serious negative
implications on a lawyer's willingness to report suspected misconduct, which
will only hurt clients. The purpose behind the Rules of ProfessionalConduct
is for lawyers to regulate their own profession. The ruling in Bohatch is
counterproductive to this purpose. Furthermore, the Bohatch court essentially
held that the at-will nature of partnerships outweighs the fiduciary duties of
good faith and fair dealing in expulsion situations.
The legislature and courts of other jurisdictions must heed the
implications of Bohatch and make a conscious effort to choose ethics over
business. The solution is simple. These jurisdictions need only enact a statute
that contains the same whistleblower protections applied to many other
professions in state and federal governments. The statutes can be formulated
in such a way as to promote the reporting of ethical violations while still
ensuring that those lawyers who choose to make unsubstantiated claims will
not enjoy any statutory protection, thereby striking a balance between the
concepts of good faith, ethical duties, and the at-will nature of a partnership.
MICHAEL A. FISHER*
151. Id. at 557-58 (Hecht, J., concurring).
152. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 42, at 1794-95 (arguing that the court's emphasis on an
"irreparable schism" of partners in Bohatch shows that the court placed strong importance on law
firms thriving as a business).
153. See id. (discussing the concern of the court in Bohatch that such reporting could cause
instability in the firm).
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